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Abstract
The number and importance of private companies in the United
States indicates that reliable quality of financial accounting reports
(QFAR) of private companies that are useful for decision making
is likely to be important for economic growth. Most previous
research examining QFAR addressed earnings management among
publicly-traded companies. This study extends prior literature by
examining whether abnormal production of public and private
companies is impacted by (i) assurance type (PCAOB-audit,
GAAS-audit, and SSARS-Review), (ii) tax status (separately taxed
versus pass-through entity) of private companies, and (iii) relative
size. An audit of financial statements provides a high degree of
assurance, whereas a review provides limited assurance. Due to
data limitations with our private company sample, this study
focuses on earnings management through abnormal production by
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manufacturing companies. When examining companies that just
met the benchmark of prior years' earnings or zero earnings we
found positive abnormal production for publicly traded companies
and privately held audited-taxable companies, but not for other
privately held companies. Not identified in previous studies, we
find that abnormal production of similarly sized public companies
and private companies differ. Our findings provide evidence
relevant to the Big GAAP/Little GAAP debate and that one set of
accounting standards may not satisfy all public and private
company financial statement users. Also, results of this study
support the recommendations of the Financial Accounting
Foundation’s Blue Ribbon Panel’s Report for establishing a
separate private company standards board to help ensure
appropriate modifications to GAAP.
Acknowledgement: We thank the University of Louisville,
College of Business for a Summer Research Grant to
support this project.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privately-owned enterprises have traditionally been an
important part of the U.S. economy. According to the U.S. Small
Business Administration (2013a, 2013b), privately owned
companies produced 46% of private nonfarm U.S. gross domestic
product in 2008 and private sector businesses with less than 500
employees accounted for 56% of total employment in 2011.
Consequently, reliable financial statements for small and medium
sized businesses would provide many stakeholders with
information with which to make decisions that collectively have a
large impact on the U.S. economy.
The Financial Accounting Foundation's (2011) Blue Ribbon
Panel (BRP) on Standard Setting for Private Companies reported
that, in 2008, to promote investor protection the SEC only required
financial reporting by about 14,000 public companies. In contrast,
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about 28 million private companies in the U.S. operate without
formal government guidance relating to the quality and types of
information to be provided to protect investors. However, to assist
preparers and users of financial information related to private
companies, accounting regulators should recognize that the nature
and extent of private company accounting information required
and preferred could substantially differ from that required from
public companies.
In fact, the AICPA’s (2013) task force on its Financial
Reporting Framework for Small-and-Medium Sized Entities (FRFSME) noted differences in recognition and measurement of
transactions between public and private companies.
The task
force on FRF-SME also pointed out differences including: (1)
SMEs generally have more control over to whom they give their
financial statements and key financial statement users have direct
accesses to the entity’s management, and (2) SME financial
statement users may have greater interest in cash flows, liquidity,
statement of financial position, and interest coverage. The FRFSME is a non-GAAP framework, designed to provide financial
information that would be relevant, efficient, simple, and optional
for entities to use with no official or authoritative status (Durak
2013). The FRF-SME task force recognized that providing
reliable, relevant and cost-effective financial accounting reports to
users of information from small and medium sized private
companies is important for the growth of private companies and
the economy.
Most previous research examining the quality of financial
accounting reports (QFAR) addressed earnings management
among publicly-traded companies (e.g., Ching et al. 2006; Klein
2002; Badertscher 2011; Balsam et al. 2002; Jo and Kim 2007) and
the audit-related issues arising from this behavior (AshbaughSkaife et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007; Francis
and Krishnan 1999). A few recent studies have examined QFAR
of privately owned companies including Givoly et al. (2010), Hope
et al. (2013), and Kvaal et al. (2012).
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Like Hope et al. (2013), we compare public and private
company financial information to assess the quality of accounting
reports of privately-held companies.
We extend their study by
investigating the impact of independent assurance services
(audited versus reviewed) and tax status (separately taxed versus
pass-through entity) on earnings management through production
activities in the financial statements of privately-held
manufacturing companies.
Gunny (2010) examined four types of real activities
management (RAM) using public companies of all sizes from a
variety of industries. Our private company database, Sageworks,
contains much less consistent data for included observations than
that available for public companies (in COMPUSTAT), except
data relating to inventory. Consequently, we focus on one type of
RAM examined by Gunny (2010), inventory and production
decisions used in manufacturing industries.
Only manufacturers can substantially increase or decrease
reported income by adjusting work in process and finished goods
inventories to time the expensing of fixed manufacturing costs.
Also, unlike public companies, most private companies
(particularly those obtaining review services) are likely to be
relatively small. Consequently, to compare public and private
companies' production activities in a focused manner, we limit
public companies included in our sample to manufacturers with
sales in the same range as that of private companies included in the
sample, from $1 million to $150 million.
Real earnings management behavior has been examined
with respect to the demand and opportunistic behavior hypotheses
(Givoly et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2013). The "demand" hypothesis
predicts that public company shareholders and creditors will
demand higher quality reporting than that demanded of private
companies. The "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis expects
public company managers to have more incentive to manage
earnings than private company managers. These hypotheses could
have a more complex relation to earnings management behavior in
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private companies because, for example, private companies have
the option to have their financial statements audited or reviewed to
provide, respectively, a high degree or limited assurance. We did
not examine private companies with compiled or self-prepared
financial statements not covered by independent assurance
services.
Companies engage independent accountants to provide
their reports based on audit, review, or compilation of financial
statements. Audit reports provide a high degree of assurance
regarding the reliability of financial statements; review reports
provide limited assurance; and compilation reports do not provide
any assurance. In audits, whether under PCAOB auditing standards
for the audits of public companies or Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (GAAS) for the audits of private companies, auditors are
required to gather sufficient appropriate audit evidence in support
of their audit report. Review engagement reports, according to the
Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services
(SSARS) provide limited assurance for which the scope of work
undertaken by independent accountants is relatively narrower than
the scope of work undertaken in audits. In compilation
engagements, independent accountants merely compile financial
statements based on data provided by management. In this paper
we consider only audits and review services.
To obtain more reliable information for decision making,
investors are more likely to demand that managers/owners engage
independent accountants to audit rather than review their
companies’ financial statements. Also, the motivation for
managing production activities to minimize overall income taxes
differs between privately-owned taxable and pass-through
companies. Thus, in private companies, opportunistic behavior
could lead to either understating or overstating income due to
varying owner objectives.
Our study extends prior literature on earnings management
by manufacturing companies by following the approach for
measuring abnormal production used by Gunny (2010) to examine
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whether (i) assurance type (PCAOB-audit, GAAS-audit, and
Review) covering financial statements prepared according to
GAAP affects the abnormal production of public and private
companies, (ii) whether tax status (separately taxed versus passthrough entity) of private companies influences their abnormal
production, and (iii) whether relative size affects the abnormal
production of public and private companies. We find overall, that
publicly traded companies tend to have significantly negative
abnormal production, which would decrease reported income.
Analysis of different groups of private companies revealed that
audited and separately taxed companies exhibit a significantly
positive abnormal production, which would increase reported
income.
An interesting finding of our analysis that has not been
identified in previous studies is that abnormal production of public
companies and private companies differ based on their relative
size. Within our sample of companies with sales between $1
million and $150 million, public companies in the lowest size
quintile based on sales exhibit relatively higher abnormal
production (increasing reported income) while those in the highest
sales quintile exhibit relatively lower abnormal production
(decreasing reported income). In contrast, all private companies
except companies that are audited-taxed showed an opposite effect
in that the companies in the lowest size quintile based on sales
exhibit negative abnormal production while those in the highest
sales quintile exhibit positive abnormal production. The results
suggest that relatively larger public manufacturing companies
report more conservatively than smaller ones, possibly because
they are subjected to closer audit scrutiny due to higher litigation
risk and the possibility of PCAOB inspection of larger audits.
For privately-owned companies, relative size does not
appear to impact the abnormal production of audited-taxable
companies. This could result from conflicting goals faced by
private taxable companies of (1) showing good financial results for
lenders and other external users, and (2) minimizing income tax
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liability. Results for the private audited pass-through, reviewed
taxable, and reviewed pass-through company groups suggest that
the relatively larger of these companies likely have relatively
larger abnormal production while the relatively smaller of these
companies have relatively lower abnormal production. The desire
to show good financial results for lenders and other external users
could explain why relatively larger private companies exhibit
positive abnormal production. Relatively smaller private
companies are more likely to be owner managed and likely more
highly motivated to reduce tax liability by reducing income
reported for income tax purposes. (We could not verify this
potential difference because Sageworks database does not contain
ownership-and management-related data). These results appear to
indicate that accounting information generated by both public and
private companies of all sizes based on the one-GAAP framework
might not satisfy small business user needs; thus supporting the
need for an alternative non-GAAP framework as provided by the
AICPA (2013) FRF-SME task force report.
To identify companies most likely to engage in earnings
management, like (Gunny 2010), we included an indicator variable
(BENCH) for companies that just met the benchmark of prior
years' earnings or zero earnings in regression analyses. This
variable was significantly positive for publicly traded companies
and privately held audited-taxable companies. These results
provide evidence that public and private audited-taxable
manufacturing companies most likely to want to manage earnings
upwards, appear to indeed manage production and inventory
decisions. These companies may manage earnings through
production and inventory decisions because auditors are more
likely to identify manipulation of accruals than manipulation of
production and inventory levels. In contrast, companies that are
reviewed might find managing other accruals more convenient or
easier than managing production activities to manage earnings.
We proceed in section II by discussing related literature
which provides a context for our study and theoretical support for
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our hypotheses. Section III provides a description of the data and
the results of the empirical analysis in examining the hypotheses.
Section IV discusses the limitations of the study, and offers
suggestions for further research. We conclude in Section V with a
summary of results and a discussion of the implications of the
findings.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Earnings management is defined as when managers use
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to
alter reported data to influence contractual outcomes that depend
on reported accounting information (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 6).
Prevalent earnings management has been found in publicly-traded
companies (e.g. Fields et al. 2001; Healy and Wahlen 1999;
Kothari et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Zhao et al. 2012).
Earnings management can occur through accruals management or
real activities management, such as managing production and
inventory levels.
Roychowdhury (2006, 337) defines real activities
(transactions) management as “actions that deviate from normal
business practices, undertaken with the primary objective to
mislead certain stakeholders into believing that earnings
benchmarks have been met in the normal course of operations”.
For example, management can deviate from normal operations by:
reducing research and development expenditures, reducing selling,
general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), deferring write-off
of fixed costs, increasing or decreasing production and inventory
levels to decrease or increase costs of goods sold, suspending
business development activities to lower revenue, and offering
unusual price discounts at the end of a period to increase sales.
All of these actions would impact reported earnings in the
short term. Real activities management differs from accruals
management because real activities have direct cash flow
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consequences; real activities management negatively affects future
operating performance (Gunny 2010; Zhao et al. 2012). Several
studies have found activities management to be associated with
earnings management in publicly-traded companies (e.g. Cohen et
al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010; Eldenburg et al. 2011; Gunny 2010;
Roychowdhury 2006; Thomas and Zhang 2002; Zhao et al. 2012).
Gunny (2010) found that real activities management is associated
with companies just meeting their earnings benchmarks.
As mentioned previously, the Sageworks data was not
complete for many observations. Consequently, constructing real
earnings management variables to obtain a sufficient sample size
of private companies was difficult. However, most Sageworks
manufacturing observations did report production and inventory
data. Due to data limitations, we focused on examining production
and inventory levels of public and private manufacturing
companies to determine the impact of assurance-type on real
activities management.
In our sample we included only
manufacturing companies because only manufacturing companies
could effectively manage earnings through their production and
inventory decisions.
Regulations and Preferences in Managing Accruals and
Activities
As stated in the introduction, differences in real earnings
management between private and public companies have been
examined based on the demand and opportunistic behavior
hypotheses (Givoly et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2013). Public company
shareholders and creditors can "demand" higher quality reporting
than that demanded of private companies. Public companies
experience higher agency costs than private companies due to, for
example, more greatly dispersed ownership of public companies
and greater separation between managers and owners of public
companies (Hope et al. 2013). Conversely, public company
managers have more incentive to engage in "opportunistic
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behavior" to manage earnings than private company managers.
Lower relative ownership of the company by managers of public
companies than private companies could lead public company
managers to a short-term focus on executive compensation tied to
reported earnings such as bonuses and stock options (Hope et al.
2013).
Regulation may also impact how much firms manage
earnings, and what type of earnings management they use. Public
trading of company shares on stock markets have been found to
have a negative impact on accounting quality (Beatty et al. 2002).
However, Ewert & Wagenhofer (2005) found that tightening
accounting standards (regulations) makes the use of accrual
management more difficult, resulting in an increase in real
activities management. Consistent with this, Cohen et al. (2008)
found that real activities management increased after
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2004. SOX,
by establishing the PCAOB to monitor the accounting industry,
tightened accounting regulations to improve the quality of
financial accounting reports. This additional regulation appears to
have restricted the use of accrual management, forcing companies
to use real activities management to manage earnings.
Earnings management might improve communication of
private information by lessening the information asymmetry
between the management and external investors (efficient earnings
management) or could maximize benefits to management by
increasing the price of the shares managers hold in the company
(opportunistic earnings management) (Balsam et al. 2002;
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997;
Cheng and Warfield 2005). Managers of public companies are
frequently faced with ethical dilemmas between their obligation to
provide reliable and fair QFAR to stakeholders, and their own
short-term personal interest.
To maximize share price, management in publicly-traded
companies prefer to report steadily increasing earnings and avoid
reporting losses (Roychowdhury 2006). Managers of publicly-
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traded companies have an incentive to manage earnings to meet
certain milestones and forecasts to secure their jobs (DeFond and
Park 1997) and satisfy shareholders, creditors, and analysts (Daniel
et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2005; Trueman and Titman 1988;
Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Public company managers may also
desire to manipulate/manage earnings to earn/increase bonuses
and/or increase the value of stock/options they own.
Cohen & Zarowin (2010), focusing their analysis around
seasoned equity offerings, found that companies use both accrual
and real activities-based earnings management to manipulate
earnings. When examining the tradeoffs between accrual and real
activities management, Zang's (2012) study suggests that managers
treat the two strategies as substitutes to manage earnings;
managers first consider management of real activities before
considering accruals management. Likewise, managers exhibit a
greater preference to manage earnings through real activities
management than through accrual management (Bruns and
Merchant 1990; Graham et al. 2005) because: (1) accrual
management is more likely to draw the attention of auditors while
increasing or decreasing inventory levels through adjusting
production is a management decision and is not likely to be
subjected to the same level of audit scrutiny as those for accruals
management (Roychowdhury 2006), (2) managers perceive
earnings management through real activities management as more
ethical than accruals management (Bruns and Merchant 1990), and
(3) a recent study indicates that investors perceive accruals-based
earnings management a more serious violation of their trust in
managers than real earnings management (Hewitt et al. 2013).
Public vs. Private Companies and Inventory Management
(Abnormal Production)
A significant number of studies address earnings
management through production and inventory levels using data
sets consisting of publicly-traded companies (Badertscher 2011;
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Chien et al. 2011; Gunny 2010; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Bartov
and Cohen 2009; Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury 2006; Thomas
and Zhang 2002). However, only recently has real activities
management research focused on privately-held companies (Asker
et al. 2011; Bharat et al. 2010; Brav 2009; Edgerton 2012; Gao et
al. 2010; Michaely and Roberts 2012; Minnis 2011; Saunders and
Steffen 2011; Sheen 2009).
For publicly-traded companies, earnings management has
been found to be related to: corporate governance, valuation
issues, disclosure frequency, and stock ownership characteristics.
However, compared to publicly-traded companies, private
companies do not have: the same reporting requirements, the same
level of regulations, same type of ownership structure or the same
level of external scrutiny. Consequently, corporate governance,
valuation issues, disclosure frequency, and stock ownership
characteristics may impact earnings management by private
companies differently or not at all.
Also, other factors might motivate private companies to
manage their earnings, such as to minimize overall income taxes
(e.g. Beatty and Harris 1999). Likewise, the transparency of
information and goals of investors/owners could influence whether
a firm manages earnings. Further, the use of GAAP as proscribed
by the FASB and PCAOB is likely to be complex and costly to
private companies leading some private companies to prepare
statements that depart from standards not considered useful.
Recent research has addressed several issues with private
companies.
Some of this research has empirically tested
differences between private and publicly-traded companies. For
example, in examining public and private banks, Beatty & Harris
(1999) argued that private companies manage earnings less
aggressively because they have less information asymmetry with
owners and have a greater proportion of long-run investors. Some
studies comparing publicly and privately owned companies used
limited samples of U.S. companies. Givoly et al. (2010), analyzed
a sample of 531 private equity firms with 2519 firm-year
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observations and found that private equity firms have higher
quality accruals and a lower propensity to manage income than
public equity firms. Gao et al. (2010) used public and private
companies in the CapitalIQ database to compare CEO
compensation. They found that public-company CEO pay was
sensitive to measures such as stock prices and profitability while
CEO pay in private companies was not.
Asker et al. (2011) obtained the Sageworks data base that
provided a large sample of private companies to compare to
publicly-traded companies. All data in their sample covered from
2002 to 2007. They matched companies from Sageworks and
COMPUSTAT on size and industry and developed a sample to
contain 4,975 observations from each data set, coming from 1,666
and 620 separate publicly-traded and private companies,
respectively. They found that publicly-traded companies invested
considerably less and were less responsive to changes in
investment opportunities than were private companies. These
results were especially pronounced in industries where earnings
announcements impacted stock prices the most. Asker et al.
(2011) concluded that an agency problem might explain the
differences in investment behavior between publicly-traded and
private companies; public company managers' investment
decisions reflect a focus on short-term results.
Hope et al. (2013) using a sample of 73,596 observations of
public and private firms, found that, on average, public firms have
higher accrual quality and report more conservatively, which is
consistent with the “demand” (for higher quality information)
effect dominating the “opportunistic behavior” effect. Their study
did not examine the effects of different tax statuses (taxable and
pass-through) and/or the impact of different assurance levels
(audits and review) on QFAR. Further, their sample included
numerous industries. Since our study focuses on the effects of
production and inventory activities on QFAR under different
assurance types and tax statuses, our analyses include
manufacturing companies only.
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Results from the studies cited, and the Blue Ribbon Panel’s
report (2011) would suggest private and publicly-traded companies
differ in many ways. One set of accounting standards may not
allow users to adequately evaluate the differences between public
and private companies. Consequently, examining whether
privately-held companies exhibit similar abnormal production
patterns as those found in publicly-traded companies becomes
important.
Level of Assurance
The type of assurance (e.g., PCAOB-audit, GAAS-audit or
SSARS-review) is likely to affect the quality of financial
statements of the company. Under the “opportunistic behavior”
hypothesis, public company managers generally have more
incentive to manage earnings than privately-held company
managers (e.g., Givoly 2010). However, as Hope et al. (2013)
found, the demand for higher quality information, including
stricter regulations governing public companies, likely restricts
public company practices that manage earnings more so than
private company managers. For example, auditors of publiclytraded companies are subject to more regulatory oversight than
auditors of private companies.
Audits of public companies are subject to periodic PCAOB
inspection. The PCAOB can impose sanctions for violations of
auditing standards (such as by suspending audit firm and/or
associated auditors from auditing public companies, and/or by
imposing monetary penalty which in some cases could exceed
$2,000,000).1 Further, auditors of public companies are likely
exposed to higher levels of litigation and adverse publicity risk
than auditors of private companies in the event of an audit failure.
See PCAOB’s Settled Disciplinary Orders,
http://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Pages/default.aspx
1

Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 17, No. 3 (2016)

639

Consequently, regulatory and audit scrutiny may not allow
management of public companies the same level of opportunity to
manage earnings as private company managers.
Only privately owned companies can choose among
different levels of assurance associated with their financial
statements. We limited our analysis to private companies whose
financial statements were either audited or reviewed by certified
public accountants; private companies with compiled or selfprepared financial statements not covered by independent
assurance services were not included in our sample. Independent
accountants engaged to review financial statements only offer a
limited negative assurance by stating that they are not aware of any
material modifications that should be made to the financial
statements for the statements to be in accordance with GAAP
(AICPA 2009). In contrast, when issuing a clean audit opinion,
auditors are required to provide a high degree of assurance that
financial statements are free of material misstatements (including
those that may result from production management) and are
presented in accordance with GAAP. In addition to complying
with GAAS, independent auditors face a greater level of litigation
risk than the risk-level faced by independent accountants engaged
to review financial statements.
Consequently, managers of companies using review
services may likely find it easier to manage production activities
compared to those using audit services. However, this does not
necessarily mean that reviewed financial statements will be
unreliable. The reliability of reviewed financial statements
depends on the tone at the top and is likely to be comparable to
those of audited financial statements when management insists on
tightly controlled financial reporting.
Further, the increase in costs to provide potentially
irrelevant information from limited accounting resources has led
some private companies to prepare financial statements containing
departures from GAAP, which users are willing to accept. The
Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) questioned whether the aspects of U.S.
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GAAP, which might not be relevant to many users, are truly
"generally accepted" (Hilmi et al. 2012). Further, in many
situations, preparing overly complex GAAP financial statements
(and obtaining audit, review, or compilation services) forces small
and medium sized private entities (SMEs) to incur unnecessary
costs. In this regard, the AICPA's FRF-SMEs purports to formally
provide an alternative framework for preparing reliable non-GAAP
financial statements that are efficient with qualitative attributes of
objectivity, measurability, completeness and relevance.
Whether all companies should comply with the same
GAAP has been debated for years as users and preparers of
financial statements have frequently called for a separate set of
standards for relatively small companies. Frequently in this
debate, the two sets of standards option has been referred to as Big
GAAP/Little GAAP (Burton et al. 1979; Burnie et al. 1987/1988;
Grusd 2006; Thrower 2010; Wright et al. 2012). Thus, we cannot
predict whether the demand for higher quality financial
information by users and auditors as users’ agents will outweigh
opportunistic behavior and other incentives for private companies.
Tax Status of Companies
In addition to ownership structure, the tax status of a
company could influence the way management of a private
company is motivated to manage earnings. Private companies
have more options when establishing their form of business entity
than publicly-traded firms. Almost all publicly-traded companies
are formed in a C corporation status. In contrast, only 5.7% of the
companies that filed tax returns in 2008 with the Internal Revenue
Service were C corporations (IRS 2011), indicating that a large
proportion of non-public companies are not formed as C
corporations. Regular corporations (C corporations) pay separate
income taxes at the corporate level; then dividends are taxed to
owners when distributed.
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Private companies also have the following options:
individual ownership, incorporating as an S corporation or limited
liability corporation (LLC), and forming as a limited liability
partnership (LLP) or other form of partnership. (The Sageworks
database identifies the legal/organizational form of their
observations.) Partnerships, LLPs, LLCs, and S Corps are usually
pass-through entities that generally are not taxed at the entity level.
The earnings of these entities are typically reported to owners, and
included on their individual income tax returns to determine
owners’ taxable income.
Asker
et
al.
(2011)
found
that
different
organizational/ownership structures of private companies did not
appear to impact their investment behavior. However, legal forms
other than in the form of ‘C corporation’ can provide a tax benefit
with respect to the combined tax liability of the business and its
owners. Consequently, private companies may have different
incentives to try to increase or decrease income (by adjusting
inventory levels) depending upon their tax status. Privately-held
audited, separately taxed companies are somewhat comparable to
publicly-held companies.
Because of potential effects of tax status on earnings
management, we also examine privately-held taxable companies
separate from privately-held pass-through companies. Taxable
companies are subjected to double taxation because their income
is taxed at both the company level and at owners’ level (via
dividends). Thus, managements of these companies could be
motivated to underreport taxable income through managing
production levels (e.g., overstating cost of goods sold and
understating inventory). However, the more formally structured
taxable private companies may have incentives to report higher
incomes to make financial statements appealing to suppliers and
lenders.
While incomes of taxable companies are subjected to
double taxation, incomes of pass-through companies are included
in owners’ tax returns for determining taxes. As a result, owners’

642 Foster, Mueller & Shastri: Production Management by Manufacturers

motivation to adjust production may vary depending on the
circumstance dictated by owners’ overall tax burden based on
taxable income consisting of owners’ income from the business
and from other sources. Accordingly, managers can (i) manage
production accrual to adjust reported income in the financial
statements, or (ii) make adjustment in their tax return (based on
income and/or losses from other activities) for determining taxable
income without adjusting financial statements, or (iii) adjust both
financial statements and tax returns.
Further, companies (audited or reviewed) that are
separately taxed are subjected to more scrutiny of tax auditors.
(See IRS 2013.) Therefore, it could be argued that financial
statements of private companies that are separately taxed are likely
to be more reliable than those of pass-through companies.
However, tax authorities are likely to be more concerned with
companies exhibiting negative abnormal production (reducing
reported income and income taxes due) than those exhibiting
positive abnormal production. Consequently, we present the
following hypotheses (in the null form):
H1: Public and private companies that are audited and taxable
exhibit similar abnormal production.
H2a: Private company financial statements that are auditedtaxable and those reviewed-taxable exhibit similar abnormal
production.
H2b: Private company financial statements that are audited passthrough and those reviewed pass-through exhibit similar abnormal
production.
H3a: Private companies that are audited-taxable and those audited
pass-through exhibit similar abnormal production.
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H3b: Private companies that are reviewed-taxable and those
reviewed pass-through exhibit similar abnormal production.
Size of the Company
Size of a company could influence behavior of public and private
company management, which could affect QFAR. We address this
possibility by limiting our sample overall to companies with sales
between $1 million and $150 million. However, even within this
group of relatively small manufacturers (compared to most
publicly traded manufacturers), a wide variation in size exists
which could impact abnormal production levels. For example, in a
small owner-managed private company with relatively weak
control over financial reporting, the owner-manager might be able
to easily adjust production and inventory to achieve a desired level
of taxable income. In contrast, a larger company with more
effective internal control over financial reporting and subject to
closer scrutiny by internal, external, and tax auditors might find it
difficult to manipulate earnings. Also, relatively different sized
companies could have different incentives to increase or decrease
income. As a result, we examine the following hypothesis (in the
null form):
H4: The size of public and private companies does not
impact the level of abnormal production reported.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Data
This study examines the data from Sageworks
Incorporated’s database, a proprietary source of private company
information, and public information from the COMPUSTAT
database. The Sageworks Inc. private company database contains
collected and assembled private company information to help
accounting firms and banks compare data for individual companies
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to a set of peer company data (Minnis 2011). The information
comes from the clients of Sageworks’ customers/users who enter
their clients’ financial statement information into the system.
Information gathered from all of Sageworks customers' clients
constitutes their private company data set. Sageworks offers
customers/users access to summary statistics from this data set by
subscription.
The Sageworks data set includes income statement and
balance sheet items, calculated ratios, some cash flow information,
the level of assurance of the information (e.g., review, or audit),
the private companies' industry (NAICS code), legal form, fiscal
year-end, and state. However, the data set does not indicate:
whether a company prepares statements in accordance with GAAP
or another comprehensive basis of accounting (OCBOA), auditor
name, opinion in the audit or review report issued, and whether
GAAP departures, if any, are disclosed. Sageworks has accounting
and programming specialists who work to maintain the integrity of
information in the data set. Sageworks briefly allowed researchers
access to company-level data, with companies only identified by
an ID number, but no longer makes its firm-level information
available publicly.
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection approach used, beginning
with 423,631 observations for 2001 through 2008 in the Sageworks
database.2 To examine our research questions in a focused context
required production and inventory-related data of manufacturing
companies. Accordingly, from this large data set we identified
companies reporting sales in the manufacturing NAICS codes
(311822 to 339999), which yielded 31,835 observations. Years
before 2005, contained substantially fewer observations with the
necessary three years data for analysis than the later years. Earlier
years therefore might be subject to selection bias because
Sageworks had fewer subscribers during the data set start-up phase
2

The latest year used was 2008 because at the time the data set was obtained,
complete data for 2009 was not available.
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(Minnis 2011). Consequently, observations prior to 2005 were
omitted, leaving 24,307 observations. We discovered that several
of these observations were duplicate annual observations or
quarterly data; these we dropped, reducing the observations to
20,542.
Table 1
Derivation of Usable Manufacturing Observations in Sample
Sageworks Total
Observations
2001-2004
2005
2006

Sageworks
Observations
with sales

COMPUSTA
T
Observations
with sales

87,655
73,914
89,674

7,528
5,671
6,548

3,156
3,022

2007

92,410

6,534

2,849

2008

79,978

5,554

2,651

423,631
Less: 2001-2004 observations
Total 2005-2008 observations
Less duplicates and quarterly

Total

31,835
7,528
24,307
3,765

Observations from 2005-2008
Less: Observations with < $1 million in
sales1, or > $150 million in sales, or missing
variables.
Less: Sageworks observations whose data
source was complied, company prepared,
annualized, tax return, blank, or other.

20,542

11,678

32,220

13,089

7,416

20,505

2,604

_____

2,604

Usable Observations with all variables
Less: observations with < 15 observations in
a year in 3-dig NAICS Code

4,849

4,262

9,111

38

72

110

Sample for main analyses2
4,811
4,190
9,001
1
Only 155 observations from the Sageworks data with sales from $100,000$1,000,000 had all necessary data for variables. Most of these smaller companies
did not have the required three years consecutively reported data.
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2

The sample included 2,451 separate Sageworks companies and 1,163
COMPUSTAT companies.

Estimating abnormal production for an observation
required companies to have data for three consecutive years. We
also restricted the sample to companies with sales of $1 million or
greater because a small manipulation in inventory and production
might have a magnified effect on income, and smaller companies
may not have the same know-how or systems to manage earnings
as larger companies. Further, there were only 155 Sageworks
companies with sales less than $1 million that had sufficient data
to be included in the analysis. These restrictions eliminated
another 13,089 observations, most due to incomplete data. Also,
to restrict our analysis to observations in which accountants
offered a reasonable degree of assurance (audit) or limited
(review) assurance, we deleted 2,604 observations (related to
compiled, company prepared, tax return, other or left blank)
leaving 4,849 Sageworks observations for analyses.
The COMPUSTAT sample also was collected from
manufacturing companies (NAICS codes 311822 to 339999) for
2005 through 2008 that reported sales for three consecutive years
(11,678 observations). To construct a sample comparable to
Sageworks companies, those observations with sales more than the
largest sales reported by a Sageworks observation ($150 million)
or less than $1 million in sales were deleted. This step eliminated
7,416 COMPUSTAT observations, leaving 4,262.
The abnormal production calculation required at least 14
other observations from the same three-digit NAICS code for a
year. Consequently, companies from three-digit NAICS codes
with few observations were deleted. This led to the deletion of 38
Sageworks observations and 72 COMPUSTAT observations.
Thus, the full sample for the main analysis included 9,001
observations (4,811 Sageworks + 4,190 COMPUSTAT) from
3,614 separate companies (2,451 Sageworks + 1,163
COMPUSTAT).
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Observations from COMPUSTAT remained somewhat
steady over the years examined, with slight declines from 2005 to
2008. In contrast, the number of Sageworks observations
increased substantially from 2005 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2007;
total observations were essentially the same for 2007 and 2008.
The mix of Sageworks observations by level of assurance (audit
and review) and tax status (pass-through and taxable) remained
relatively stable from 2005 to 2008.
Companies included in the sample came from a broad
range of manufacturing industries, but were concentrated in a few
industries. For example, over 40% of the COMPUSTAT
observations came from computer and electronic product
manufacturing companies and over 22% were companies in
chemical manufacturing. In contrast, for the private companies,
only fabricated metal products and machinery manufacturing
represented high percentages of total observations at 19% and
15%, respectively. The percentages of observations by three-digit
NAICS codes were similar for the private company sample broken
down by level of assurance and tax status.

Statistical Models
Within each three-digit NAICS code for each year, we use
Roychowdhury (2006, 345) equation 4, and Cohen et al. (2008,
766) equation 7, to estimate abnormal production. Production is
defined as the companies' cost of goods sold plus change in
inventory for the year. To estimate abnormal production, the
following regression equation was run:
(1)
PRODt,f/At-1,f = α0 + α1(1/ At-1,f) + α2(Salest,f/ At-1,f) +
α3(Salechgt,f/ At,f) + α3(Salechgt-1,f/ At-1,f) + εt,f
where: PRODt,f = (cost of goods soldt,f + change in inventoryt,f)
At-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year,
Salest = current year net sales,
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Salechgt = change in sales during current year,
Salechgt-1 = change in sales during previous year, and
εt = the error term from the regression is abnormal
production, Ab_Prodt; a positive Ab_Prodt would
indicate the company increased reported income,
whereas a negative Ab_Prodt indicates the company
decreased reported income.
Like Gunny (2010), we constructed variables to indicate
companies that would most likely want to manage their incomes
(for example, to avoid reporting a loss or avoiding reporting lower
net income than that of the previous year): (1) MEET_0 = 1 if net
income scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year was
greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, (2) MEET_last = 1
if net income of the current year scaled by net income of the
previous year was greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01,
and (3) any observations falling within these categories are
considered to have the greatest incentive/likelihood of engaging in
earnings management to increase income and consequently were
coded as BENCH = 1.
We constructed a formula similar to that used by Gunny
(2010) to test whether those companies most likely to manage
income exhibited different Ab_Prodt than others:
(2)
Ab_Prodt = α0 + α1(BENCHt) + α2(Size_lnAt-1) + α3(ROAt)
+ α6(Industryf ) + α7(Yearg) + εt
where: Ab_Prodt was defined as the residual from Equation 1
above,
BENCHt was defined in the previous paragraph,
Size_lnAt-1 = the natural log of total assets at the beginning
of the year,
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by total
assets at the beginning of the year,
Industryf = 1 if company is in industry f (based on 3-digit
NAICS codes), 0 otherwise, and
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Yearg = 1 if the observation is from year g, 0 otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses to Address
Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b
Table 2 provides the means for public (COMPUSTAT)
companies and Sageworks companies (by level of assurance and
organization tax status) for variables from Equations 1 and 2 and
the residual from Equation 1, the abnormal production measure.
Some differences between the groups are evident based on means
shown in Table 2. The means of PRODt, one_At-1, Salest, salechgt,
salechgt-1, BENCHt, ROAt, and Ab_Prodt appear quite a bit lower
for public companies than for private companies. In contrast,
Size_lnATt appears much higher for public companies than for
private companies.
Also, means for Ab_Prodt of private
companies appear to vary somewhat by tax status.
To help examine Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b we
calculated Z-test statistics for Ab_Prodt = 0 for the various sample
groups. For the subsamples, only the publicly traded companies,
with a negative Ab_Prodt (mean = -0.012), and the private auditedtaxed group, with a positive Ab_Prodt (mean = 0.026), exhibited
significant Z-test scores. The opposite signs on the means of the
groups and the significant Z-tests provide evidence to support
rejection of null Hypothesis 1 (relating to abnormal production of
comparable public versus private audited-taxable companies),
indicating that abnormal production exhibited by public companies
differs from that exhibited by private companies that are audited
and taxable.
While Ab_Prodt of privately-owned audited-taxable
companies is significant, the means for the other private company
subgroups generate nonsignificant Z-test statistics. This indicates
differences between Ab_Prodt of privately-owned audited-taxable
companies and the other groups. These differences provide some
evidence to reject Hypotheses 2a and 3a, in that Ab_Prodt of
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privately-owned audited-taxable companies differ from both the
privately-owned reviewed-taxable and audited pass-through
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Full
Sample and Various Subsamples
Panel A: Full, COMPUSTAT, and All Private companies
samples
All
COMPUSTAT All Private
9001
4190
4811
Variable
N=
PROD_A_t_1

1.275
1.029

0.710
0.712

1.767
1.010

one_A_t_1

0.228
0.350

0.101
0.250

0.339
0.386

Sale_A_t_1

1.773
1.268

1.038
0.899

2.413
1.193

salechg_A_t_1

0.156
0.501

0.106
0.419

0.199
0.559

salechg_1_A_t_1

0.129
0.404

0.072
0.335

0.180
0.450

BENCHt

0.089
0.284

0.060
0.238

0.113
0.317

Size_ln_TA

2.448
1.495

3.405
1.327

1.615
1.076

ROAt

-0.067
0.433

-0.243
0.534

0.086
0.230

-0.0031
-0.012
0.006
0.318
0.313
0.322
Means and (standard deviations)
1
Windsorizing results in AB_PROD mean slightly different from zero.
AB_PROD = 0
(2-tailed Z test)
-0.756
-2.489**
1.237
AB_PROD
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Table 2
(continued)
Panel B: Private company subsamples
PrivatePrivateAuditedAuditedPass
Taxable
Through
837
801
Variable
N=

PrivateReviewed
-Taxable
1393

PrivateReviewed–
Pass
Through
1780

PROD_A_t_1

1.492
0.854

1.732
1.025

1.743
1.001

1.931
1.047

one_A_t_1

0.193
0.284

0.180
0.231

0.458
0.444

0.387
0.389

Sale_A_t_1

2.026
0.984

2.352
1.174

2.394
1.164

2.636
1.263

salechg_A_t_1

0.206
0.482

0.217
0.555

0.161
0.545

0.217
0.602

salechg_1_A_t_1

0.164
0.402

0.201
0.450

0.144
0.461

0.205
0.462

BENCHt

0.134
0.341

0.081
0.273

0.150
0.357

0.089
0.285

Size_ln_TA

2.230
1.063

2.223
0.995

1.187
0.925

1.388
0.971

ROAt

0.025
0.269

0.114
0.279

0.047
0.129

0.132
0.236

-0.016
0.345

0.012
0.311

0.001
0.328

-1.313

1.440

0.129

AB_PROD

0.026
0.301
Means and (standard deviations)
AB_PROD = 0
(two-tailed Z
test)`

2.499**
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Table 2
(continued)
**,***--Significant at .05 and .01, respectively.
Variable Definitions:
PROD_A_t_1 = (cost of goods soldt,f + change in inventoryt,f)/total assets at the
beginning of the year.
one_A_t_1 = 1/total assets at the beginning of the year.
Sale_A_t_1 = current year net sales/total assets at the beginning of the year.
salechg_A_t_1 = change in sales during current year /total assets at the
beginning of the year.
salechg_1_A_t_1 = change in sales during previous year /total assets at the
beginning of the year.
BENCHt = 1 if net income scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year
was greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, or MEET
if net
income of the current year scaled by net income of the previous year was
greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, else 0.
Size_ln_TA = the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the year.
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the
beginning of the year.
AB_PROD = the error term from the regression of PROD_A_t_1 is abnormal
production.

company groups. Nonsignificant Z tests on Ab_Prodt for the
audited pass-through, reviewed-taxable, and reviewed pass-through
companies provide no support to reject Hypotheses 2b and 3b.
Analyses of Abnormal Production for Companies Most Likely
to Manage Earnings and the Impact of Size on Abnormal
Production
Our abnormal production measure, constructed by the error
term from a regression model (1) of expected production, could
result from factors other than intentional manipulation. Abnormal
production could be caused by an omitted variable or capture an
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efficient management decision (Gunny 2010). Accordingly, we
also analyzed the data and tested the hypotheses for a context
where a strong likelihood of earnings management exists. As
described above, following Gunny (2010), we constructed an
indicator variable (BENCH) for companies that meet the
benchmarks of just meeting or barely exceeding zero net income,
or their previous years' income. Like Gunny (2010, 871), we also
included the log of total assets to control for size effects, and ROA
because real earnings management may be correlated with
performance. Our Equation 2 differs from Gunny in that we do not
include a market to book value variable to control for growth
opportunities because our sample includes privately owned
companies for which market value is unknown. (Gunny also
multiplied her abnormal production measure by -1, leading to
reversing the signs on their reported parameter estimates.)
Motivations to manage earnings may differ between
different sized companies even within these relatively small
manufacturing companies -- particularly when considering private
companies (with differing tax statuses) compared to public
companies. Because the overall size restriction for inclusion in our
sample was based on sales from $1 to $150 million, we add
indicator variables for size based on sales. For manufacturing
companies, differences in sales may be better indications of size
differences than differences in total assets; differing depreciation
methods and differing ages of assets could lead to wider variation
in a measure of total assets than a measure of variation in sales.
We add two variables for size to Equation 2 to construct Equation
2a which is used to test our hypotheses:
(2a) Ab_Prodt = α0 + α1(BENCHt) + α2(Size_lnAt-1) + α3(ROAt)
+ α4(Sales_quint_lowt) + α5(Sales_quint_hight) + εt
where: Ab_Prodt, BENCHt, Size_lnAt-1, and ROAt were defined
above,
Sales_quint_lowt = 1, if the observation falls in the lowest
quintile of sales for the full sample, 0 otherwise, and
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Sales_quint_hight = 1, if the observation falls in the highest
quintile of sales for the full sample, 0 otherwise.
Table 3 shows the results from regression analyses based on
Equation 2a.

Table 3
Cross-sectional Regressions Relating Abnormal Production to
Companies Just Meeting Zero or Previous Year’s Earnings
Panel A: Full, COMPUSTAT, and All Private companies samples

All

COMPUSTAT

All Private

9001

4190

4811

-0.005

-0.149

0.042

-0.50

-6.43***

2.61***

BENCHt

0.031
2.94***

0.030
1.84*

0.003
0.21

Size_ln_TA

-0.003
-0.70

0.034
5.34***

-0.004
-0.68

Variable

N=

Intercept

ROAt

Sales_quint_low

Sales_quint_high

-0.157

-0.145

-0.388

-11.01***

-8.42***

-8.86***

-0.011

0.045

-0.027

-0.97

2.57***

-1.78*

-0.012

-0.068

0.128
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Adjusted R2

-1.14

-5.58***

6.86***

0.045

0.076

0.083

Table 3
(continued)
Panel B: Private company subsamples
PrivatePrivateAuditedAuditedPass
Taxable
Through
Variable

N=

PrivateReviewed
-Taxable

PrivateReviewed –
Pass Through

837

801

1393

1780

-0.038

-0.013

0.095

0.067

-0.94

-0.27

3.80***

2.55**

BENCHt

0.043
1.74*

0.031
0.90

-0.019
-0.84

-0.009
-0.34

Size_ln_TA

0.025
1.65*

0.013
0.70

-0.035
-2.90***

-0.001
-0.11

Intercept

ROAt

-0.220

-0.429

-0.565

-0.455

-2.32**

-4.52***

-6.41***

-7.27***

Sales_quint_low

0.029
0.63

-0.161
-2.79***

-0.041
-1.70*

-0.041
-1.77*

Sales_quint_high

0.026
0.80

0.150
3.99***

0.157
2.71***

0.174
4.47***

Adjusted R2

0.041

0.158

0.053

0.115

**,***--Significant at .05 and .01, respectively.
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Parameter estimates and t-statistics for independent variables from Gunny
(2010), less market to book value, plus variables for highest and lowest sales
quintiles.

Gunny (2010) found an insignificant impact for ROA on
Ab_Prodt, while we found a negative and significant coefficient for
ROA overall and in all subgroups. The impact of ROA may be
more pronounced for our relatively small manufacturing company
sample compared to the public company sample from all industries
included in Gunny’s analysis. For our overall sample, the
coefficient for BENCH was positive and significant, like Gunny’s
(2010, 872), indicating that companies just meeting earnings
benchmarks were more likely to have increased production.
BENCH was significant for the public (COMPUSTAT)
subsample, suggesting that public companies are likely to engage
in managing production activities to manage earnings. Within
privately-held companies, while BENCH for audited-taxable
companies was positive and significant, BENCH was insignificant
for all other privately-held groups, indicating that privately-held
audited-taxable companies are also likely to engage in production
management to manage earnings. Further, BENCH for the
privately-held audited pass-through group is positive (0.031)
though not significant, whereas BENCH for reviewed taxable and
pass-through subsamples are negative and insignificant.
These results suggest that audited public and audited
private-taxable companies (with positive BENCH) might manage
earnings by managing production activities to satisfy financial
statement users. In contrast, we find no evidence of earnings
management related to BENCH for reviewed-companies. The
significance on BENCH for audited public and private-taxable
companies may result from closer auditor scrutiny which might
prevent audited companies from managing other accruals.
Consequently, audited-taxable companies may be more likely to
engage in earnings management through production and inventory
decisions. Possibly, reviewed companies could manage earnings
through other accruals. Also, users of reviewed financial
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statements may have access to all desired information about the
company, whereas users of audited companies might be more
dispersed, requiring the services of an external auditor as their
agent.
The coefficients on Size_lnAt-1, Sales_quint_lowt and
Sales_quint_hight reported in Table 3 show the impact of size on
abnormal production for the overall sample and various
subsamples. In line with Gunny’s (2010) results, the coefficient
for Size_lnAt-1 is positive and significant for public companies.
Within privately-held companies, Size_lnAt-1 is: (1) positive and
significant for the audited-taxable group, and positive but
insignificant for audited pass-through, (2) negative and significant
for the reviewed-taxable subsample, and negative but insignificant
for reviewed pass-through subsample. These results indicate that
asset-size does impact Ab_Prodt of privately-held companies
differently in various subgroups. Further, BENCH and asset size
appear to impact Ab_Prodt in similar directions.
As indicated above, Table 3 also includes the effect of size
(based on sales) on Ab_Prodt.
Sales_quint_lowt and
Sales_quint_hight for the subgroups reveal an interesting size
effect. Public companies in the lowest sales quintile exhibit
significantly higher/positive Ab_Prodt, while public companies in
the highest sales quintile exhibit significantly lower Ab_Prodt. In
contrast, private companies collectively (n=4811) exhibit the
opposite size effect: the full private sample and all private
company subsamples except the audited-taxable subsample,
exhibit
significantly
lower
abnormal
production
in
Sales_quint_lowt, and significantly higher abnormal production in
Sales_quint_hight. These results provide support for rejecting
Hypothesis 4, because size (based on both assets and sales
revenue) does influence abnormal production.3
3We extended our analyses on the effects of size on Ab_Prodt because
Size_lnAt-1, Sales_quint_lowt, and Sales_quint_hight are correlated.
Accordingly, we adjusted Equation 2 by excluding the variable Size_lnAt-

Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 17, No. 3 (2016)

633

Results reported in Table 3 reveal that the impact on
Ab_Prodt of Sales_quint_high and Sales_quint_lowt differs
between public companies and all (n=4811) privately-held
companies. These differences hold in almost all cases for private
company subgroups. The differences in the signs on
Sales_quint_hight and Sales_quint_lowt within the samples provide
strong evidence to reject Hypothesis 4, that size does not impact
abnormal production. These results should warrant caution by
researchers when comparing real earnings management of private
companies and public companies, or when using a combined
sample of private and public companies to draw inferences.
IV. LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Kvaal et al. (2012) found that the real earnings
management behavior of family-owned private firms tend to be
different from nonfamily-owned private firms. We could not
address this issue due to lack of ownership information in the
Sageworks database. Prior studies have also indicated that the
quality of financial reporting may vary depending upon auditor
size. We did not have information regarding either which public
accounting firm performed the audit or the type of independent
accountant opinion related to private company financial
statements.
Due to data limitations in our Sageworks private company
sample we restricted our sample to manufacturing companies and
focused on inventory and production activities management.
Differences in earnings management between public and private
companies in industries other than manufacturing, through
measures other than production and inventory decisions could be
and rerunning the analyses. In this additional analysis, results for
BENCH conform closely with those in Table 3 and results for the sales
size variables differ only slightly from those reported in Table 3.
1
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even wider and more unpredictable due to complexity of
accounting regulations (such as accounting for fair values).
However, as recognized by the FRF-SME task force and BRP
Panel, some of these reporting requirements could be irrelevant to
most users of most private company financial statements.
Limitations suggest future avenues for research. Samples
with more detailed ownership information related to private firms
could allow examination of differences between family-owned
versus nonfamily-owned private companies as found by Kvaal
(2012). A sample with more detailed auditor and audit opinion
information for private companies would allow examination of
whether auditor size and auditor opinion affect the quality of
financial reporting by private companies. Also, a larger sample
would allow an investigation of the effects of other potential
earnings management methods.
V.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF
IMPLICATIONS
For our sample of relatively small public manufacturing
companies (with sales ranging between $1 & $150 million) the
demand for high-quality information apparently leads to significant
negative abnormal production overall (Table 2); particularly,
public companies in the largest sales quintile of our sample tend to
manage production to decrease reported earnings (Table 3). This
could be due to closer auditor scrutiny to comply with PCAOB
standards and possible PCAOB inspection of larger audits.
However, the potential for opportunistic behavior by managers of
public companies may also explain some results: public companies
are likely to manage production to increase reported earnings to
just meet certain benchmarks (Table 3).
Results from our privately-owned company sample indicate
a more complex relationship between abnormal production and
company characteristics than that for publicly traded companies.
Overall, audited-taxable companies exhibit significant positive
abnormal production (Table 2), suggesting audited taxable
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companies are more likely to use production and inventory
decisions to increase earnings, and less likely to understate income
(e.g., to minimize tax liability) than companies in other subgroups.
Further, audited-taxable companies in the highest and lowest
quintiles do not exhibit significantly different abnormal
production, suggesting that size differences among the auditedtaxable companies do not impact production and inventory
decisions (Table 3).
In contrast, while private companies in other groups
(audited pass-through, reviewed-taxable and pass-through) do not
exhibit overall significant abnormal production (Table 2), they
exhibit significantly higher (lower) abnormal production in the
highest (lowest) quintiles (Table 3). These outcomes may arise
from conflicting incentives for these companies, influenced by
size. Reviewed-taxable, and audited and reviewed pass-through
companies may experience lower demand for high-quality
information, (perhaps due to less complex ownership structures).
Opportunistic behavior by managers (to obtain personal
compensation or external financing for the company) in these three
groups of private companies (audited pass-through, reviewedtaxable and reviewed pass-through) could explain the significant
positive abnormal production in the largest quintile.
However, the potential for opportunistic behavior for tax
avoidance by managers of private companies in the smallest
quintile may also explain the significantly negative abnormal
production exhibited by these three groups of private companies.
Collectively these results suggest that, in some accounting
contexts, financial information from private companies that are
audited-taxable should be analyzed separately from other private
companies. Also, taxing authorities might want to more carefully
examine reported inventories from private companies (particularly
small ones) that could be motivated to manage earnings downward
to minimize tax burden.
Results reported in Table 3, provide strong evidence that
abnormal production of private and publicly owned manufacturing
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companies differs depending upon their relative size. Further,
public and private-taxable audited companies might rely more on
managing production activities to meet certain earnings
benchmarks, rather than managing other accruals, because of audit
scrutiny. These results suggest caution when research findings and
recommendations from studies examining only publicly traded
companies are extrapolated to private companies.
Our results reveal significant differences in management of
production activities between public and private manufacturing
companies, and between audited-taxable private manufacturing
companies and other private manufacturing company groups.
Differences between public and private companies' accounting
methods, ownership structure, and/or incentives to manage
earnings lend credence to Big GAAP/Little GAAP advocates.
Current accounting regulations are mainly based on a one-GAAP
philosophy focusing on public company user needs. These
regulations may not satisfy the needs of private company financial
statement users.
The FRF-SME task force observed that, compared to
publicly traded companies, small owner-managed businesses have
different financial statement users with varying informational
needs and that many key users of SMEs’ financial statements have
direct access to the entity’s management. Consequently,
information asymmetry/gap between preparers and users of
financial information is likely to be smaller for private companies
compared to those of public companies.
According to the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) Report (2011),
private companies, under current practice in the United States,
may report under U.S. GAAP or some Other Comprehensive Basis
of Accounting (OCBOA). Consequently, an increasing number of
private company financial statements are prepared in accordance
with OCBOA (usually cash or tax basis) or sometimes depart from
U.S. GAAP with such departures disclosed in the accountant's or
auditor's report (Hilmi et al. 2012). The BRP Report points out
that the current accounting standards setting process has not
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evaluated and addressed the information needs of users of private
companies and how their information needs differ from those of
users of public company financial statements.
Our results support the BRP conclusion that urgent and
growing systemic issues need to be addressed in the current system
of U.S. accounting standard setting. Any new accounting
standard-setting system should seek to maintain a high degree of
financial reporting comparability for business entities, regardless
of their ownership structure. The BRP recommended establishing,
under the oversight of Financial Accounting Foundation, a separate
private company standards board to help ensure appropriate and
sufficient exceptions and modifications are made for both new and
existing standards. The AICPA (2013) FRF-SME task force report
provides a non-GAAP framework as an alternative to GAAP for
small and medium sized entities. This non-GAAP framework
might, to some extent, address the BRP’s concerns about the
burden placed on SMEs by the one-GAAP framework.
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